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THE WARSAW CONVENTION LIABILITY SCHEME: WHAT
IT COVERS, ATTEMPTS TO WAIVE IT AND WHY THE
WAIVERS SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED UNTIL THE
AIRLINES ARE FINANCIALLY STABLE
JEFFERY C. LONG*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE CONVENTION for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Transportation by Air, commonly re-
ferred to as the Warsaw Convention (hereinafter "Warsaw
Convention" or "Convention"), has undergone multiple altera-
tions since its inception in 1929 to adapt to changes in the inter-
national airline industry.' This article examines the elements of
* Associate, Hewitt & Prout, Sacramento, California. I would like to thank
Professor Margaret Turano, St. John's University School of Law, for her
invaluable guidance. I would also like to thank George P. McKeegan for the two
years he spent teaching me about the intricacies of airline litigation.
I See generally Larry Moore, The New Montreal Liability Convention, Major Changes
in International Law: An End to the Warsaw Convention, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
223 (Spring 2001) (describing general overview of the "Warsaw System"). Moore
cites the evolution of the Warsaw Convention's liability scheme as follows:
The 'Warsaw System' collectively refers to the following instru-
ments: Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]; Protocol to Amend
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to In-
ternational Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929,
opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371; Convention
Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed
by a Person Other than the Contracting Carrier, opened for signature
Sept. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol to Amend the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car-
riage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by
the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for
signature Mar. 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613; Additional Protocol No. 1 to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Octo-
ber 1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28
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the Warsaw Convention and, more specifically, the require-
ments that must be satisfied before a passenger's incident can
fall within its purview. The scope of the Convention is impor-
tant because an injury that is governed by the Convention can
be compensated only pursuant to its terms. Therefore, a passen-
ger involved in an occurrence that falls within the parameters of
the Convention, but that is not compensable under its terms, is
left with no remedy because of the preemptive effect given to
the Convention.
Part II of this article discusses the attempts by airlines to enter
into private agreements to waive the liability limitations of the
Warsaw Convention. These waiver agreements were a response
to pressure from the public to eliminate the $75,000 damage
limit imposed by the Convention, which is grossly inadequate
when compared to typical wrongful death and/or personal in-
jury awards given by American juries. However, passengers or
their heirs trying to use these agreements to avoid the harsh lim-
its of the Convention have encountered resistance from the judi-
ciary, and the future of these agreements is unknown.
Part III of this article focuses on the current struggles of the
airline industry. The Gulf War of the early 1990s, the events of
September 11, 2001, and the recent invasion of Iraq have all
placed extreme pressure on an industry with little room for er-
ror built into its profit structure. Numerous airlines have al-
ready filed for bankruptcy protection and more have threatened
to follow if wage negotiations with strong unions do not yield
dramatic payroll cuts. Additionally, the bailout package issued
by the United States Government was insufficient to save many
September 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc.
9145; Additional Protocol No. 2 to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by the Pro-
tocol Done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for signa-
ture Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9146; Additional Protocol No. 3 to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Octo-
ber 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on 28
September 1955 and at Guatemala City on 8 March 1971, opened for
signature Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9147; Additional Protocol No. 4
to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Oc-
tober 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on 28
September 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in Sec.
Rep. No. 105-20 .
Id. at 223 n.1.
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struggling airlines and the current proposals to provide addi-
tional funding are only a fraction of what the industry claims it
needs to survive. Further, the combination of fewer passengers,
higher operating costs, and lower fare prices is threatening to
drive more airlines into bankruptcy or liquidation. The airlines
were in a stronger financial position prior to the first Gulf War
than they were immediately before the recent invasion of Iraq
and their ability to emerge from this crisis is still unknown.
Part IV analyzes my proposals to deal with the current crisis
facing the airline industry. A narrow interpretation of the
waiver agreements entered into by the various airlines will allow
the limitations of the Warsaw Convention to remain in effect
and maximize any bailout package approved by Congress for the
airlines. The movement to waive the liability limits should be
abandoned. Nobody believes $75,000 is adequate payment for
the loss of life or most severe personal injuries, but, absent will-
ful misconduct by the airline, it is not fair to place the additional
burden of paying large judgments on an industry that is impor-
tant to our national economy and is facing an urgent economic
crisis. The general public is aware of certain known risks associ-
ated with flying and, unfortunately, the list of risks associated
with flying has grown following the September l1th attacks.
However, this does not mean that the airlines should be the
party forced to absorb these new risks, especially if the money to
satisfy these judgments will have to come from the federal
government.
II. WARSAW CONVENTION OVERVIEW
The Warsaw Convention established a uniform set of rules for
the determination of airline liability in the transportation of pas-
sengers, baggage, and cargo. 2 Initially drafted in 1929, the War-
saw Convention has evolved to adapt to the myriad of changes
within the airline industry throughout the twentieth century.
The first change came in 1955 and aimed to update the Warsaw
Convention following the large expansion of commercial airline
travel that followed the conclusion of the Second World War.3
The rules remained static until changes were proposed at a se-
2 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
3 See Moore, supra note 1 (outlining evolution of the Warsaw Convention and
amendments).
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ries of conventions held in Montreal in the late 1990s. The
meetings, which culminated in the adoption of the Montreal
Protocols,4 updated the Warsaw Convention and started the dis-
cussion among airlines regarding waiving the $75,000 liability
limitation that had been the backbone of the Warsaw Conven-
tion for years.5
The Warsaw Convention applies to claims arising out of inter-
national air transportation as defined in the Convention. Sim-
ply, international air transportation to which the Convention
applies is transportation between two nations that are parties to
the Convention or between two places in a single signatory na-
tion if the transportation involves an agreed-upon stopping
place in another nation.6 Determining whether transportation
meets the definition of international and, therefore, falls within
the purview of the Warsaw Convention, is based on the contract
of transportation, which is generally, the passenger ticket and
baggage check for passengers, and the airway bill for cargo.7
The Warsaw Convention, as amended, imposes strict liability
on an airline upon the happening of certain events. The major-
ity of litigation brought under the Warsaw Convention involves
whether a particular incident is within the scope of Article 17,
which establishes the requirements that must be met to bring a
plaintiff seeking damages for injuries suffered in connection
with a qualified international flight, within the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The following is the complete text of Article 17:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.'
Any cause of action determined to fall within the parameters
of Article 17 is governed solely by the Warsaw Convention,
which, via supplemental agreements signed by the majority of
international air carriers, imposes strict liability up to $75,000
on the airlines.9 However, many international airlines that serve
the United States have filed tariffs with the Department of
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
7 Id.
8 Id. art. 17.
9 See generally Carey v. United States, 255 F.3d 1044, 1047 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Transportation that might effectively waive the $75,000 limit.10
The trend towards waiving the limitation resulted from growing
concerns in the 1990s that the families of passengers who died
in airline catastrophes were limited to the recovery of $75,000,
despite the fact that wrongful death actions in the United States
arising from accidents not involving international travel typically
provided families of the deceased substantially greater
amounts. 11
The key issues in potential Warsaw Convention cases are
whether the plaintiff can establish that she suffered a "bodily
injury" either onboard the aircraft or during embarking or dis-
embarking. Purely psychological injuries are not considered
"bodily injuries" under the Convention, 2 but, if they occurred
as the result of an "accident," the Convention preempts all other
potential claims and the passenger is left without a remedy."3
Once the plaintiff establishes that she suffered a physical in-
jury she must prove that it occurred either onboard the aircraft
or during the process of embarking or disembarking. The pre-
eminent case in this area was decided by the Second Circuit in
1975. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 4 adopted a three-part test
to determine whether the plaintiff was injured during the pro-
cess of embarking or disembarking. The Day test evaluates (1)
what the passenger was doing at the time the incident occurred,
(2) the level of control exerted by the airline over the passenger
at the time of the incident, and (3) the location of the inci-
dent. 5 Application of the Day test allows the court flexibility
10 Id.
11 See generally Bob Egelko, Carrier Liability; Damage Pact Protects Airlines; Treaty
Invoked in Recent Ruling on Alaska Airline Disaster, S.F. CHRON., May 13, 2001, at A8
("Although times and air travel have changed drastically, the plan to protect the
fledgling airline industry by limiting liability on international flights still governs
modern-day air disasters. An anachronism to passengers' lawyers and a haven of
stability for airlines, the convention endures as a bar on the damages victims of
international air disasters or their heirs can collect."); Michael Skapinker, Read
the Small Print: Michael Skapinker Describes the Confusion Over Damages for Airline Acci-
dents, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 1, 1996, at 18.
12 See generally Turturro v. Cont'l Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(holding plaintiff could not recover for purely psychological injuries unless there
was a physical manifestation of the injury).
13 See generally King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating
plaintiff's only recovery was under the Warsaw Convention because the treaty
preempted all state law claims); Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138 (2d
Cir. 1998) (same).
14 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
15 See id. at 33.
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when determining whether a plaintiff not on board an aircraft
fits within the Warsaw Convention under the "embarking or dis-
embarking" clause.
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
1. Physical Injury Requirement
The United States Supreme Court decided two cases in the
1990s dealing with whether an international passenger could re-
cover for purely psychological injuries under the Warsaw Con-
vention. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd 6 because a conflict had developed between
the Eleventh Circuit and the influential New York Court of Ap-
peals regarding the physical-injury requirement of the Warsaw
Convention. 7
In Floyd, a group of passengers on board a flight from Miami
to the Bahamas were told over the loudspeaker that the plane
was going to be abandoned in the ocean because the engines
had failed."8 After several minutes the crew was able to restart
one of the engines and coast to a safe landing in Miami without
any passengers sustaining physical injuries.1 9 Several passengers
filed suits against the airline alleging claims under both the laws
of Florida and the Warsaw Convention, but the state-law claims
were not addressed by the district court.2" The district court
concluded that the plaintiffs could not recover for their alleged
psychological injuries because "[a] bsent an allegation of physi-
cal injury, the Complaints in this case do not state a cause of
action under the Warsaw Convention. '21 The court's decision
was based on its interpretation of the French clause "ldsion
corporelle" in the original drafting of the Convention, which
was held to mean "bodily injury" and not mental anguish
16 499 U.S. 530 (1991) [hereinafter Floyd III].
17 See Floyd v. E. Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter
Floyd I] (holding passengers could recover for purely mental injuries under Arti-
cle 17 of the Warsaw Convention). But see Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974) (concluding passengers could not recover for "psychic
trauma" unrelated to physical injury because Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion did not provide recovery for purely mental injuries).
18 Floyd III, 499 U.S. at 533.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 534 n. 2. See also In re E. Airlines, Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport,
629 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Fla. 1986) [hereinafter Floyd 1] (dismissing with prejudice
the state-law causes of action).
21 Floyd I, 629 F. Supp. at 314.
WARSAW AMD WAIVERS
alone. 22 However, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the dis-
trict court's interpretation of the French phrase and reversed its
decision. 2' The Eleventh Circuit stated that its "study of [the
phrase "1sion corporelle" in French law] convinced [it] that
there [was] nothing in French law prohibiting compensation for
any particular kind of damage, including emotional trauma,
provided the damage [was] certain and direct. '24 This created
the conflict between the New York Court of Appeals and the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and led to the decision by the
Supreme Court.25
The Supreme Court focused on treaty-interpretation princi-
ples and the past practice of signatory States in concluding that
the Eleventh Circuit should have upheld the district court's con-
clusion that the Warsaw Convention did not provide relief for
purely psychological injuries. 26 The Supreme Court concluded
"that an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when
an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical
injury, or physical manifestation of injury. ' 2 7 The decision was
based largely on the fact that no French court had held "16sion
corporelle" to include non-physical injuries. 2' Further, no evi-
dence before the Supreme Court established that any signatory
State had interpreted Article 17 to allow recovery for the type of
injuries alleged by the plaintiffs in Floyd.29
The Supreme Court's decision to not allow recovery for emo-
tional distress and other non-physical injuries was a relief for
international air carriers. Allowing causes of action based solely
on psychological injuries would open the proverbial floodgates
of litigation. Any aircraft that was faced with a potential emer-
gency landing could face hundreds of lawsuits stemming from
the fear passengers encounter in these situations regardless of
whether the situation on board the aircraft actually caused phys-
ical injury. These situations are an unfortunate risk of flying,
but requiring the airlines to pay damages for incidents generally
beyond its control would place an undue burden on the airlines
22 Id. at 313-14.
23 Floyd II, 872 F.2d at 1489 (reversing the district court opinion).
24 Id. at 1472 (examining the meaning of "lesion corporelle" under French
law).
25 See generally supra note 17.
26 Floyd III, 499 U.S. at 534-42.
27 Id. at 552.
28 Id. at 537-38.
29 Id. at 546-52.
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and raise insurance rates, which would ultimately increase the
cost of international travel for passengers. The only way an air-
line could avoid liability for psychological injuries in these in-
stances would be to prove it had done everything possible to
avoid the occurrence, which requires the airline to meet a high
burden of proof.
Eight years later, the Supreme Court upheld its decision in
Floyd and expanded its rationale for barring causes of action
based on non-physical injuries when it decided El Al Israel Air-
lines, Ltd. v. Tseng30 The plaintiff in Tseng was subjected to an
intrusive security search while waiting for a flight from John F.
Kennedy International Airport in New York to Tel Aviv, Israel. 1
The allegations included a list of psychosomatic injuries but
failed to name either a physical injury or a physical manifesta-
tion of the emotional injuries suffered by the plaintiff.3 2 Plain-
tiff s claims were not allowed under the Warsaw Convention
pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Floyd. Additionally,
the Court held that plaintiff s state-law causes of action were pre-
empted, leaving plaintiff with no forum to seek recovery for the
alleged injuries.3 The Court rationalized the harsh result to the
plaintiff by discussing a situation where a different conclusion
would defeat the purpose of the Convention.
Passengers physically injured in an emergency landing might
be subject to the liability caps of the Convention, while those
merely traumatized in the same mishap would be free to sue
outside of the Convention for potentially unlimited damages. 4
The Supreme Court further stated that:
The Court of Appeals' construction of the Convention [which
would allow suits against airlines under the Convention for non-
physical injuries,] would encourage artful pleading by plaintiffs
seeking to opt out of the Convention's liability scheme when lo-
cal law promised recovery in excess of that prescribed by the
treaty. Such a reading would scarcely advance the predictability
that adherence to the treaty has achieved worldwide. 5
Therefore, the only conclusion that promotes the purpose of
the Convention is that non-physical injuries are not compensa-
ble under the Convention's liability scheme and such claims are
30 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
31 Id. at 160.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 176.
34 Id. at 171.
35 Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
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also preempted by federal law, barring a plaintiff from resorting
to state law causes of action for purely psychological injuries.
2. Warsaw Convention "Accident"
The accident requirement contained in Article 17 of the War-
saw Convention provided little guidance for courts trying to de-
termine whether an incident should be covered by the
Convention's liability limits. The distinction between what did
and what did not qualify as an accident became increasingly im-
portant after it was determined that the Warsaw Convention
provided the exclusive basis for relief for injuries sustained dur-
ing an international flight. 6 A narrow interpretation of what
constituted an accident would bar passengers who sustained
physical injuries during an international flight but who could
not prove that the incident satisfied the accident requirement of
Article 17 from recovering for their injuries. Conversely, a
broad interpretation of the accident requirement could encom-
pass every claim made by a passenger injured during an interna-
tional flight and would defeat the purpose of the Convention by
creating liability for incidents that are an ordinary risk of flying
and are beyond the airlines' control. The Supreme Court en-
ded the controversy in 1985 when it defined what constituted an
accident under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention in Air
France v. Saks. 7
The plaintiff in Air France flew from Paris to Los Angeles with-
out incident until the plane started its descent. Plaintiff claimed
that during the descent the plane's pressurization system failed,
which caused her to feel extreme pain in her left ear.3 She did
not inform the crew on board the airplane about her pain and
several days later she consulted a doctor. The doctor told her
that she was permanently deaf in her left ear as a result of the
change in pressure aboard the Air France flight. Plaintiff then
commenced an action against the airline for negligent mainte-
nance and operation of the pressurization system aboard the
aircraft. 9
The Supreme Court chose between the two interpretations of
the Article 17 accident requirement presented by the parties.
36 See generally supra note 12.
37 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
38 Id. at 394.
39 Id. at 394-95 (describing the undisputed facts leading to plaintiffs claim for
relief under the Warsaw Convention).
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Plaintiff argued that the accident requirement included any haz-
ard of air travel that causes a passenger to suffer a physical in-
jury.4" Whereas, Air France claimed that the normal operation
of an aircraft cabin pressurization system is not an accident.4"
The Court accepted the airline's argument and presented three
rationales to support its decision. First, it noted that the drafters
of the Convention intended there to be a difference between an
"accident" and an "occurrence" because it used these remarka-
bly different terms to describe covered incidents in Article 17
and Article 18 of the Convention.42 Second, the Court noted
that "the text of Article 17 refers to an accident which caused the
passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the passen-
ger's injury. '4 3 Finally, "the weight of precedent in foreign and
American courts" favors a narrow interpretation of which inci-
dents are within the purview of Article 17.44
The decision to use "accident" in Article 17 and "occurrence"
in Article 18 demonstrates that the drafters of the Convention
did not intend for the two Articles to cover the same breadth of
incidents. Article 18 makes recovery for lost luggage simple: if a
passenger checks a piece of luggage and never gets it back, the
airlines must compensate the passenger up to the statutory
amount allowed under the Convention.45 The rationale for be-
40 Id. at 395.
41 Id. (emphasizing that "[a]ll the available evidence, including the postflight
reports, pilot's affidavit, and passenger testimony, indicated that the aircraft's
pressurization system had operated in the usual manner").
42 Id.
43 Id. (emphasis in original).
44 Id. at 400.
45 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 18. The full text of Article 18 states:
(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked luggage or
any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained
took place during the transportation by air.
(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding
paragraph shall comprise the period during which the baggage or
goods are in charge of the carrier, whether in an airport or on
board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside an airport, in
any place whatsoever.
(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any
transportation by land, by sea or by river performed outside an air-
port. If, however, such transportation takes place in the perform-
ance of a contract for transportation by air, for the purpose of
loading, delivery or transshipment, any damage is presumed, sub-
ject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event
which took place during the transportation by air.
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lieving that Article 18 was intended to be more inclusive than
Article 17 is similar to the rationale behind the tort doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.4 6 If the passenger can demonstrate that the air-
line accepted the piece of luggage and the airline cannot prove
that the luggage was returned, the exact incident that led to the
lost luggage is irrelevant because whatever happened was the
airline's fault. On the other hand, passenger injuries within the
purview of Article 17 differ from the res ipsa loquitur situation
because a passenger could suffer an injury for multiple reasons,
not all of which are directly linked to the airline's negligence. 47
The distinction between an accident that causes an injury ver-
sus an injury that is an accident can be elusive, but the Supreme
Court has attempted to explain the concept by referring to
American tort law.48 If a flight attendant fails to properly secure
a door prior to departure, causing the cabin to lose air pressure
during the flight and leading to the passenger's loss of hearing,
it is an accident that led to an injury. Conversely, if a passenger
loses her hearing because of an internal reaction to the natural
shifting of air pressure encountered during a flight, the injury is
not caused by an accident but rather is the accident, and should
not be the airline's liability.
The Supreme Court ultimately created a catch-phrase that
courts have used when determining whether a plaintiffs claim
falls within the definition of an accident adopted by the Court.49
It "conclud[ed] that liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passen-
ger."50 The terminology employed by the Court limits the expo-
sure of liability by airlines to events that are "external to the
passenger" and, therefore, more likely to be within the control
46 See generallyJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 48 (1948) ("The rule of res
ipsa loquitur .. means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of
negligence .... ) (citations omitted).
47 For example, a passenger could place a suitcase in an overhead compart-
ment that meets all the specifications for carry-on luggage and the suitcase could
fall out of the overhead compartment after the flight concludes even though the
airline never controlled the item. In this instance the airline is still liable for
injuries suffered by a passenger as a result of this incident.
48 Air France, 470 U.S. at 398-99 (citing Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
291 U.S. 491 (1934)).
49 See generally Tseng, 525 U.S. at 166 n.9 (quoting Air France, 470 U.S. at 405,
and applying the "unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to
the passenger" phrase adopted by the Air France court); Husain v. Olympic Air-
ways, 316 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).
50 Air France, 470 U.S. at 405 (emphasis added).
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of the airlines' employees. The airlines will still be found liable
for events that are arguably beyond their control,5' but limiting
airline exposure to events external to the passenger provides a
bright-line distinction between an incident for which the airline
might be liable and an incident that was an internal reaction for
which the passenger should be denied recovery because it fur-
thers the purpose of the Convention.
B. SECOND AND ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES
1. Embarking/Disembarking Requirement
The Supreme Court has not interpreted the embarking or dis-
embarking requirement of the Warsaw Convention. Although
Warsaw cases have been decided in federal courts throughout
the United States, the majority of influential decisions cited by
the Supreme Court when it addresses a Warsaw Convention is-
sue have been decisions from the Second and Eleventh Circuits.
These circuits, which govern most of New York and all of Cali-
fornia, respectively, are ideal for deciding these cases because of
the importance of international air travel to the airports located
in these jurisdictions. The cases discussed in this section are not
binding on all circuits in the United States, but they provide a
strong indication of what the Supreme Court may hold if it de-
cides to address this requirement of the Convention.
The Second Circuit first addressed the embarking/disembark-
ing issue in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.52 The passengers in
Day had checked in, had proceeded through passport control
and customs, had spent time in a passenger-only waiting lounge,
and were either standing in line waiting to be searched or were
being escorted to the departure gate when terrorists attacked
the area." The court discussed multiple issues that are impor-
tant when determining whether a passenger was in the process
of embarking and, therefore, within the purview of the Warsaw
Convention. The court concluded that the passengers met the
criteria for embarking. 4 The Day test was later adopted by the
Southern District of New York in Upton v. Iran National Airlines
Corp. 55
51 See supra note 47.
52 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
53 Id. at 32.
54 Id. at 33-34.
55 450 F. Supp. 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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The Upton court stated that there were three important fac-
tors to analyze when deciding whether a passenger met the Con-
vention's embarking/disembarking requirement. The court
must look at (1) the type of activity the passenger was involved
in; (2) whether the airline exercised control over the passenger;
and (3) the location of the passenger within the airport.5 6 These
three factors were the court's way of employing the analysis used
by the Day court in a more structured manner.
The passenger in Upton had checked in, but the flight was
delayed so he waited in a public area without proceeding with
the other steps in the boarding process. Applying the Day fac-
tors, the court concluded that the passenger was not in the pro-
cess of embarking. 57 The court emphasized that there were four
additional steps in the passenger-boarding process used by Ira-
nian National Airlines at that particular airport and that the pas-
senger was free to exit the building.5"
The Day test for embarking/disembarking is still the predomi-
nant test applied by courts in these types of cases, but two cases
decided in 1990 refined the test. In Buonocore v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.59 the Second Circuit said, "The factors to be consid-
ered are: (1) the activity of the passengers at the time of the
accident; (2) the restrictions, if any, on their movement; (3) the
imminence of actual boarding; and (4) the physical proximity of
the passengers to the gate. '6° The Buonocore court used its ex-
panded version of the Day test to conclude that a passenger who
had checked in but was waiting in the public area of the airport
near a snack cart was not in the process of embarking, regard-
less of whether he was in the area only because the airline in-




58 Id. (noting the four additional steps included passing through passport con-
trol, clearing international customs, waiting in the passenger-only lounge, and
completing the security check process). See also Rolnick v. El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd., 551 F. Supp. 261, 263-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (emphasizing the importance of
airline control in determining whether a passenger was embarking by finding
that a passenger was not embarking when she slipped on an escalator after check-
ing in but before passing through passport control).
59 900 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990).
60 Id. at 10 (citing Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.
1975)).
61 Id. at 10-11.
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The Eastern District of New York validated the Buonocore
court's changes to the Day test in 1990 when it decided Barratt v.
Trinidad & Tobago Airways Corp.,62 and also emphasized that the
passenger was embarking because she was "actively engaged in
preparations to board the plane."6 The combination of the two
additions to the embarking/disembarking analysis made by the
Buonocore and Barrett courts cleared up the issue and led to less
litigation over the embarking/disembarking requirement of the
Warsaw Convention, which might be why the Supreme Court
has not granted certiori to a case dealing with the issue.64
Soon after Day, in Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,6"
the Ninth Circuit discussed the varied approaches used by the
federal courts that have decided the embarking/disembarking
issue before settling on an approach adapted from the Day fac-
tors. The Maugnie court stated that:
[S]ince the Convention drafters did not draw a clear line, this
Court is also reluctant to formulate an inflexible rule. Rather, we
prefer an approach which requires an assessment of the total cir-
cumstances surrounding a passenger's injuries, viewed against
the background of the intended meaning of Article 17. Location
of the passenger is but one of several factors to be considered.66
62 No. CV 88-3945 (RR), 1990 WL 127590 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990).
63 Id. at *3 (quoting Buonocore, 900 F.2d at 10).
64 Two New York cases in which the embarking/disembarking issue played a
major role after 1990 were Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) and King v. American Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002).
Turturro dealt with a passenger who insisted on being let off the plane after the
plane had left the terminal gate, but before the plane was ready to take off.
When the plane was ordered to return to the gate by the police the passenger was
escorted off the plane. She later filed charges against Continental and the court
had to determine when the disembarking procedure had concluded and, there-
fore, at what point the plaintiffs claims were no longer within the confines of the
Warsaw Convention. Further, the main issue in the case was not when plaintiff
had completed the disembarking process, but rather whether she could recover
for solely emotional injuries that were not accompanied by physical manifesta-
tions of such injuries. King dealt with two passengers who claimed they were
bumped from a flight they held tickets for because of their race. The preliminary
question of whether the claims were within the purview of the Warsaw Conven-
tion required the court to apply the Day-Buonocore factors. The court determined
that the passengers were in the process of embarking because they had checked
in for their flight and boarded the vehicle that was to take them to their airplane.
65 549 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1977).
66 Id. at 1262 (stating why the court rejected a test adopted by several courts
that emphasized the location of the passenger above the other factors employed
by the Day court).
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The court ultimately concluded that the passenger did not
satisfy the embarking/disembarking requirement, but con-
trasted the situation before it with the situation the Day court
had faced.6 7 The impact of the Day holding was evident in the
Maugnie court's use of a similar analysis and its decision to dis-
tinguish the Day facts before reaching a different conclusion.
Another court within the boundary of the Ninth Circuit, the
California Appellate Court, acknowledged the Day and Buonocore
decisions when it found in Aquino v. Asiana Airlines, Inc.68 in Jan-
uary 2003, that the Warsaw Convention did not apply and, there-
fore, that federal law did not preempt the issue. The court cited
the Buonocore test in concluding that the plaintiff, who had not
checked in or passed through the security check point, was not
in the process of embarking.6 9 This decision was important be-
cause it demonstrated that the recent changes to the Day test
were likely to be adopted in other areas, which may lead to a
uniform definition of what the Warsaw Convention intended to
include as "in the process of embarking or disembarking." The
Aquino court's citation of Buonocore was also important because it
showed that a lower state court was influenced by the decisions
of the Second Circuit when faced with determining whether a
potential Warsaw Convention case was within the parameters of
the Convention and, therefore, preempted by federal law.
The Warsaw Convention, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court and the federal courts, governs a great number
of the claims against airlines operating internationally. The
courts have broadly interpreted the definition of what falls
within the purview of the Convention. In doing so, the courts
have sought to maintain the goal of limiting the liability of inter-
national carriers by closing potential loopholes that would allow
passengers to seek relief in state courts and bypass the liability
limitation. However, the down-side of this broad definition is
that most claims will be governed by the Convention, which pro-
vides limited recovery for injured passengers and, in some cases,
precludes recovery for injuries that the state courts would
recognize.
An understanding of the overall operation and effect of the
Warsaw Convention is an integral part of any discussion regard-
ing the present state of the international airline industry. After
67 Id. (agreeing with the Day approach, but distinguishing the decision).
68 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223 (Cal. App. 2003).
69 Id. at 228-29.
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having laid out the scope of the Convention's liability scheme
and the sometimes harsh results that flow from its application,
the following portion of this article discusses recent develop-
ments in the airline industry and whether the industry will sur-
vive its current financial crisis.
III. INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT ON
PASSENGER LIABILITY
The International Air Transport Association (JATA) drafted
and promoted the Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liabil-
ity7" (hereinafter "Intercarrier Agreement" or "Agreement") in
response to the overwhelming public belief that the current
$75,000 liability limitation contained in the Warsaw Convention
was insufficient to compensate the families of persons killed in
an airplane crash or passengers suffering injuries aboard an air-
craft. 71 The Intercarrier Agreement states that:
[T] he undersigned carriers agree... [t] o take action to waive the
limitation of liability on recoverable compensatory damages in
Article 22 paragraph 1 of the Warsaw Convention as to claims for
death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger within the
meaning of Article 17 of the Convention, so that recoverable
compensatory damages may be determined and awarded by ref-
erence to the law of the domicile of the passenger.72
The effect of the Intercarrier Agreement, if enforced by the
courts or adopted by Congress as part of the actual Warsaw Con-
vention, would be a waiver of the current $75,000 liability limit
and the adoption of a strict liability scheme for approximately
the first $135,00071 in compensatory damages for passengers in-
70 Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability (Oct. 31, 1995), available at
http://www.luftrecht-online.de/regelwerke/pdf/icarrier.pdf [hereinafter Inter-
carrier Agreement]. See also Tamara A. Marshall, The Warsaw Convention: A Cat With
Nine Lives Walks the Plank One More Time, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 337, 349-54 (2002)
(discussing generally the IATA changes proposed and adopted by the Intercar-
rier Agreement).
71 Intercarrier Agreement, supra note 70 (stating at the outset: "NOTING THAT
The Convention's limits of liability, which have not been amended since 1955,
are now grossly inadequate in most countries and that international airlines have
previously acted together to increase them to the benefit of passengers.).
72 Id.
73 The Intercarrier Agreement refers to Special Drawing Rights ("SDRs") when
stating currency amounts. SDRs are currency units used by the International
Monetary Fund as a universal point from which other currencies can be con-
verted. The 100,000 SDRs listed as the amount for strict liability in the Intercar-
rier Agreement is approximately $135,000, but the exact conversion changes
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jured or killed aboard a flight operated by a signatory airline.74
The airline would not have to pay any damages above the
$135,000 strict-liability threshold if it could prove that it was not
negligent, which requires proof that "all necessary measures to
avoid the damage [were taken] or that it was impossible ... to
take such measures. ' 75 The airline has the daunting burden in
this instance of proving that there was nothing the airline could
have reasonably done to prevent the injury in order to avoid
unlimited liability for compensatory damages.
After the majority of international air carriers signed the In-
tercarrier Agreement, it appeared that the restrictive-liability re-
gime of the Warsaw Convention was effectively waived. In an
article in the New York Law Journal on December 13, 1999, two
law professors discussed the only case decided at that time which
addressed the issue of whether the Intercarrier Agreement was
an effective waiver on its own or whether the signatory airlines
were also required to submit new tariffs with the Department of
Transportation before the new limits could be enforced against
them.7 6 The professors briefly described the sole case dealing
with the issue as follows:
A federal District Judge in Los Angeles, in one of the cases aris-
ing out of the crash of a Korean Airlines plane in Guam, held
that the airline's signature of the agreement, and the proclama-
tion by the Director General of IATA that the agreement had
taken effect, were sufficient to constitute an effective waiver of
the damage limitation by the airline, regardless of whether or not
the airline filed a tariff with the Transportation Department in-
corporating the agreement. 77
The article continues: "We believe this is the right answer, and
we would expect other courts to agree, but one cannot be
sure."78 The next two cases to address the validity of the liability
daily. The current conversion rates are available at http://www.imf.org/exter
nal/np/tre/sdr/db/rmsfive.cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
74 A list of the over 100 international carriers that have signed the Intercarrier
Agreement is available at www.condonlaw.com/newsletters/iatalist.pdf (last up-
dated April 2001) (last visited Nov. 12, 2003); Marshall, supra note 70, at 350
(citing Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement,
available at http://www.iata.org/legal (last visited Nov. 12, 2003)).
75 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 20(1).
76 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The Egyptair Crash: A First View
of the Law, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 13, 1999, at 1 (citing In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam,
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waiver rejected the In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam court's reason-
ing, and held that the $75,000 limit still applied. This demon-
strated the uncertainty surrounding the issue mentioned by the
professors in their article.
In Price v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines,79 the Northern District of
Georgia concluded that the Intercarrier Agreement did not au-
tomatically waive the $75,000 liability limitation of the Warsaw
Convention and that the new $135,000 strict liability scheme did
not take effect until the airline filed a new tariff with the Depart-
ment of Transportation." ° The plaintiff in Price was struck on
the knee by a beverage cart while she slept aboard a flight from
Amsterdam to Atlanta and she filed a cause of action against the
airline pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.8' Both parties
agreed that the incident was within the parameters of the Con-
vention, but they disagreed about which limitation of liability
was applicable to the airline.12 The plaintiff argued that the In-
tercarrier Agreement effectively waived the previous $75,000
limitation after the airline signed the agreement and the De-
partment of Transportation stated that it would accept the limi-
tations waiver.8 3 The airline countered that it never changed its
tariff to incorporate the new liability limitations and, therefore,
was not bound by the agreement between the airlines to in-
crease its liability until it changed its tariff.8 4 The court ulti-
mately concluded that the airline was not bound by the
Intercarrier Agreement because it had not changed its tariff to
state the new limitations. The court listed four reasons for its
decision. 5
First, the court noted that, pursuant to the express language
of the Warsaw Convention, the limitation can be altered only by
agreement between the passenger and carrier, not among the
carriers themselves.8 6 The Department of Transportation tariff
represented an agreement between the airline and the passen-
ger and the Intercarrier Agreement was only an agreement be-
tween airlines.
79 107 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
80 Id. at 1374-75.
81 Id. at 1367.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1369.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1370-73.
86 Id. at 1370; see also Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22 ("the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability").
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Second, the court interpreted the text of the Intercarrier
Agreement to require that tariffs had to be changed to alter the
liability limits. The Agreement stated that "[t] he undersigned
carriers agree to take action to waive the limitation of liability on
recoverable compensatory damages in Article 22 paragraph 1 of
the Warsaw Convention." 7 The court concluded that the Inter-
carrier Agreement was intended only as an agreement among
the airlines that they would change their tariffs to accept in-
creased liability, but it did not automatically alter the
limitations."'
Third, the agreement between the airlines that increased the
Warsaw Convention liability amount to $75,000 in 1966 was not
self-executing and required the airlines to change their tariffs
before the new amount was binding on the airline. 9 The court
quoted Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.9 ° for the proposition that
the earlier liability increase was a multi-step process. The court
stated that:
The world's major airlines, virtually without exception, signed
what became known as the Montreal Agreement [and increased
the Warsaw Convention's liability in 1966]. Under the terms of
this agreement, each airline filed a special contract with the Civil
Aeronautics Board raising the liability limit to $75,000 on all
flights to, from, or stopping over in the United States.91
The increase to the $75,000 liability limit in 1966 required the
airlines to submit a new tariff with the Civil Aeronautics Board,
which was the 1966 equivalent of the Department of Transporta-
tion, and there is no reason to interpret the Intercarrier Agree-
ment as adopting a different approach than that previously used
by the airlines.
Finally, the Department of Transportation gave the airlines
the authority to waive the limitation amount; however, it did not
waive the limitations for the airlines or state that signing the In-
tercarrier Agreement was the same as changing the applicable
tariff currently on file with the Department.9 2 This reason is fur-
ther evidenced by the court, which noted that:
87 Intercarrier Agreement, supra note 70 (emphasis added); Price, 107 F. Supp. 2d
at 1370.
88 Price, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1370.
89 Id. at 1371.
90 528 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1975).
9' Price, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 (quoting Day, 528 F.2d at 36).
92 Id. at 1372-74.
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[T]he [Department of Transportation] stated, 'By limiting our
conditions to those clearly contemplated by the IATA, we leave
no basis for the carriers to withhold immediate implementation
of the Agreements proposed.' That the carriers possessed the
power to withhold immediate implementation of the Agree-
ments suggests the [Department of Transportation] recognized
further action on the part of the carriers was required before the
changes in liability limits became effective."
The Price court's emphasis on the statements made by the De-
partment of Transportation demonstrates how imperative the
interpretation of the Intercarrier Agreement by the implemen-
tation body is, because its stance would likely shape the actions
of the signatories to the waiver. The court relied on the fact that
the order issued by the Department of Transportation noted
"implementation through tariffs provides all parties or litigants
with certainty as to the content of the applicable waivers, and
will prevent needless litigation over the lack of such clarity."94
The Price court acknowledged that the decision in In re Air
Crash at Agana, Guam95 was counter to its conclusion but refused
to follow the unpublished decision issued as part of the multi-
district litigation proceeding.96 The In re Air Crash at Agana,
Guam court did not cite a single case to support its conclusion
and relied on parts of the Intercarrier Agreement instead of
viewing the document as a whole.97 "The problem with this
analysis is that the carriers did not expressly waive anything" in
the Intercarrier Agreement, and the history of the Warsaw Con-
vention, including waivers thereto, does not support the conclu-
sion that the waiver was intended to be self-executing. 98
The Price court's decision questioned the validity of the liabil-
ity waiver and severely weakened the first decision issued on the
subject, which held that the Intercarrier Agreement did not re-
quire an airline to file a new tariff before the new limits took
effect. The independent significance of the Agreement was in
limbo following the Price decision and was further weakened by
the Northern District of Texas when it decided Verdesca v. Ameri-
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1373.
95 In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam, order ofJ. Harry L. Hupp (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
1998) (unpublished).
96 Price, 107 F. Supp. at 1374 (refusing to follow the first decision interpreting
the applicability of the Intercarrier Agreement liability waiver and upholding the




can Airlines, Inc.99 in 2000, which has been interpreted as stand-
ing for the proposition that an airline might not be subject to
the increased liability of the Intercarrier Agreement regardless
of whether it changed its Department of Transportation tariff to
comply with the provisions of the Agreement. 00
The plaintiff in Verdesca was descending a metal stairway from
an airplane after an international flight to Paris when she
slipped and fell down the stairs, sustaining severe head injuries
that ultimately led to her death.' The decedent's husband
commenced this action on behalf of himself and his wife's estate
to recover from the airline. 1 2 The complaint included claims
under state law and a claim for strict liability under the Warsaw
Convention, and the defendant moved for summary judgment
dismissing the state-law causes of action on the ground that the
incident was governed by the Convention.' The court granted
the airline's motion for partial summary judgment but failed to
provide an in-depth discussion on the issue of the damages avail-
able to the plaintiff: was the claim governed by the old Warsaw
Convention liability scheme and subject to the $75,000 limit, or,
was the $135,000 strict liability scheme found in the Intercarrier
Agreement, as incorporated in the airline's recently updated
Department of Transportation tariff, the appropriate liability
limit?
The Verdesca court discussed the $75,000 Warsaw Convention
limit and also acknowledged the Intercarrier Agreement's intent
to raise the limitation amount to $135,000.10' However, the
court did not expressly adopt either approach in its opinion.
The only discussion regarding damage amounts was in a foot-
note; it recognized that it was not deciding the issue of which
elements of damages would be available to the plaintiff. 5 The
Verdesca court cited the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.' 6 in the footnote that ad-
dressed the damage-elements issue. The Zicherman Court never
99 No. 3-99-CV-2022-BD, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15476 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17,
2000).
100 Id.
lo Id. at *2.
102 Id. at *1-2.
103 Id. at *2, 7.
104 Id. at *6.
105 Id. at *9 n.5 (contrasting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217,
224-28 (1996) (stating available damages are determined by the applicable do-
mestic law)).
106 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
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addressed the issue of whether an airline could waive the Con-
vention's limitation amount by filing a new tariff and, therefore,
it would be illogical to conclude that the Verdesca court was ad-
dressing the waiver issue when it discussed damages because it
only cited the Zicherman case for authority. The Zicherman case
only held that the type of damages, not the amount of damages,
available to a successful plaintiff in a Warsaw Convention case
would be decided by domestic law."°7
The most natural reading of [the Convention] is that, in an ac-
tion brought under Article 17, the law of the Convention does
not address the substantive questions of who may bring suit and
what they may be compensated for. Those questions are to be
answered by the domestic law selected by the courts of the Con-
tracting States. 08
The belief that the court was not endorsing the new, higher
limitation amount in Verdesca was supported by Tamara Mar-
shall's article in the Northern Illinois University Law Review,
which summarized the Verdesca holding as follows: "[e]ven
though the accident occurred on May 10, 1998, after American
Airlines had submitted changes to its tariffs, the carrier still
claimed, and the court agreed, that the Warsaw Convention pro-
vided the exclusive remedy for the plaintiff.""1 9 It is also rele-
vant that the Verdesca court did not cite the unpublished
decision in In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam because that was the
only case that would have supported a decision to apply the new
liability limitations.
The case law dealing with the Intercarrier Agreement liability
waiver does not establish a clear answer to guide an airline that
wants to assess the potential for damages stemming from airline
accidents. A court could follow the In re Air Crash at Agana,
Guam decision and conclude that an airline that has signed the
Intercarrier Agreement has effectively waived the $75,000 limit
and is subject to the $135,000 strict liability limit adopted in the
Agreement. Conversely, a court could follow the well-reasoned
opinion issued by the Price court and conclude that the Intercar-
rier Agreement is valid, but that it is only an agreement between
the airlines to change their tariff to comply with the new liability
limits. This approach applies the rationale that the Agreement
107 Id. at 225, 231.
108 Id. at 225 (acknowledging that the Convention left the issues of personal
jurisdiction and the types of damages available to the domestic courts to decide).
109 Marshall, supra note 70, at 354 (citations omitted).
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was not self-executing and takes effect only when the airline
changes its Department of Transportation tariff. Finally, a court
could choose to draw on the Verdesca decision and interpret it to
support a number of different outcomes.
I believe the Price decision will be applied by the majority of
courts faced with the liability limitation issue. The decision is
the only one that blatantly and coherently states the basis for its
conclusion. Further, the holding protects the airline industry by
offering a way to avoid the Intercarrier Agreement's higher lia-
bility that can be supported by the text and history of the Agree-
ment and the Convention. If the Verdesca decision stands for the
theory that changing an airline's tariff to incorporate the higher
liability limits does not waive the Warsaw Convention limits, the
court essentially ignored the express terms of the Convention
that allow airlines to change some terms of the Convention by
private agreement, which is what the tariff is intended to be. It
is unlikely that this approach will gain momentum. The most
palatable of the three decisions issued since the Intercarrier
Agreement was adopted is Price, but the issue will remain open
until the Supreme Court, or at least the influential Second or
Ninth Circuits, are forced to take a stance on the issue.
IV. FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY OF
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
A. THE GULF WAR
The late 1980s and early 1990s was a turbulent period for the
major American airlines. The weak economy led to a decrease
in business and recreational travel, and the commencement of
the Gulf War in Iraq and Kuwait resulted in both higher fuel
prices and more passengers avoiding air travel. These condi-
tions combined to create an environment where six large airline
companies were forced to file for bankruptcy protection and
several were eventually forced to liquidate their assets. The fol-
lowing is a brief summary of effects on the airlines that were hit
the hardest by the economic conditions prior to and during the
Gulf War:
* Eastern Airlines filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
in 1989 and was forced to cease operations in the beginning
of 1991 after its bankruptcy plan failed;"'
110 See generally Ronald Rosenberg, America West Airlines Files for BankruptcY, Bos-
TON GLOBE, June 29, 1991, at 13 (describing recent airline bankruptcies); Nikki
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" Mohawk Airlines, the largest independent regional airline
operating in the northeast, filed for bankruptcy protection
in August 1991. The president of Mohawk, Robert Peach,
blamed the need to file for bankruptcy partly on "higher
fuel prices caused by the Persian Gulf War"; 1
* Midway Airlines, a large regional airline based in Illinois,
filed for bankruptcy protection in March 1991, but was
forced to abandon its efforts to reorganize and liquidate the
airline's assets because it was unable to recoup the losses it
sustained in part as a result of the Gulf War;" 2
* Continental Airlines filed for bankruptcy protection at the
beginning of 1991 after reporting a three-month loss of
$2.2 billion, which was "one of the biggest quarterly finan-
cial losses recorded by an American corporation." The loss
was compounded by the fact that the airline only generated
$1.4 billion in revenue during the same three-month pe-
riod. Continental executives blamed "the industry's wide-
spread troubles stemming from the recession and the Gulf
War" for its poor economic performance;11
* Pan Am sought bankruptcy protection in 1991 and strug-
gled until August 1992, when it was forced to hold a liquida-
tion auction to sell off its remaining assets;" 4 and
" America West filed for bankruptcy protection in June 1991
and stated that "it was forced to seek Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection by a series of financial troubles stemming from
rising fuel prices and the dramatic decline of air traffic due
to the Persian Gulf War and the recession."'" 15
Tait, America West Files for Chapter 11, FIN. TIMES (London), June 29, 1991, at 12
(same).
- See generally AP, Mohawk Airlines' Chapter 11 Filing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1991,
at D4 (announcing bankruptcy filing).
112 See generally AP, Midway Air Liquidation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1991, at D2
(announcing Midway's change from Chapter 11 reorganization to Chapter 7
liquidation).
113 See generally AP, Earnings/Airlines: Continental $2.2 Billion in Red During Fourth
Quarter, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1991, at D3 (reporting Continental losses).
114 See generally Nikki Tait, Pan Am to Sell Remaining Assets, FIN. TIMES (London),
July 30, 1991, at 24 (announcing liquidation auction); Ira Breskin, Troubled Air-
lines Continue to Face Murky Prospects Slump May Last Six More Months, J. COM., Mar.
28, 1991, at 9B (describing meek prospects for airline recovery).
115 See generally Ronald Rosenberg, America West Airlines Files for Bankruptcy, Bos-
TON GLOBE, June 29, 1991, at 13 (announcing airline's bankruptcy plans); Nikki
Tait, America West Files for Chapter 11, FIN. TIMES (London), June 29, 1991, at 12
(same); Agis Salpukas, America West's Fight to Survive, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at
D8 (detailing final moves by America West to avoid bankruptcy).
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The airlines that avoided bankruptcy did not necessarily
emerge unscathed. Even financially sound airlines like Ameri-
can Airlines were hit hard during the Gulf War period, suffering
losses in excess of $400 million during a six-month period span-
ning from the end of 1990 to the beginning of 1991.116 Trans
World Airways (TWA), the sixth largest carrier in the United
States, also suffered major setbacks and was eventually forced to
join the list of airlines seeking bankruptcy protection in 1992
when it filed for Chapter 11 protection. 7
The impact of the Gulf War and the recession of the early
1990s were reiterated constantly by airline executives when ex-
plaining why so many airlines were forced into bankruptcy in
such a short period of time. The chairman of America West,
Edward Beauvais, made a statement that summarized the Gulf
War period succinctly when he described the early 1990s as "the
most difficult time in the airline industry's history.""18 An indus-
try that had seen growth every year since it began after World
War I was all of a sudden faced with a contracting passenger
base, which, coupled with an excessive expansion during the
1980s, was a recipe for financial disaster. 119 The Air Transport
Association recently issued a report entitled Airlines In Crisis: The
Perfect Economic Storm (hereinafter ATA Report or Report).2 °
The Report addressed the current financial state of the airline
industry and began with a summary of the Gulf War years and
the part they played in leading to the current crisis. The Report
summarized the overall impact of the Gulf War on the commer-
cial airline industry in the following chart:1 21
116 See AP, American Air Pessimistic, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1991, at D16 (discussing
the losses suffered by American Airline's Parent corporation).
117 See generally Philip Robinson, AP, TWA Files into Chapter 11 Protection, THE
TIMES (London), Feb. 1, 1992, at B19 (reporting TWA bankruptcy plans); TWA
Loss Triples in Quarter; Recession and Gul War Cited, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1991, at D2
(discussing financial losses suffered by TWA during the time period when other
major airlines were filing for bankruptcy).
118 AP, America West Airlines Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1991, at DI (reporting statements made regarding America West's decision to file
for bankruptcy).
119 See AP, U.S. Airline Traffic Off in '91, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1992, at L49 (not-
ing the first contraction of the commercial airline market since World War I).
120 Air Transport Association, Airlines in Crisis: The Perfect Economic Storm, availa-
ble at http://www.airlines.org/public/industry/bin/AirlinesInCrisis.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2004) [hereinafter ATA Report].
121 Id. at 8.
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Traffic Down 8 percent systemwide, 15 percent internationally
Daily Flights Cut by 350, reducing service to hundreds of communities
Employment 25,000 total lost jobs
Fuel Costs Up 45 percent for increased costs of $1.5 billion
Net Losses $13.1 billion over four years
Bankruptcies Seven carriers filed for bankruptcy, four liquidated
The difficult conditions gave way to a period of great eco-
nomic potential in the mid to late-1990s when the economy re-
covered, war fears subsided, and the remaining airlines were in a
position to compete for an increasing number of passengers in a
market that had recently lowered its capacity when several air-
lines closed down operations.
B. THE RECOVERY
The years following the Gulf War were extremely prosperous
for many American businesses, including the airlines. The dra-
matic difference between the early 1990s and the latter half of
the decade was summarized in a news bulletin released in the
Orlando Sentinel newspaper:
Passenger traffic on the world's airlines increased 8 percent in
1994, raising hopes the carriers turned a collective profit for the
first year since 1989, the international Air Transport Association
said [on February 14, 1995]. Airlines lost $15.6 billion over the
previous four years, suffering from recession and a sharp decline
in air travel during and after the Gulf War. IATA said combined
freight and passenger traffic grew 10 percent in 1994 while ca-
pacity increased 5 percent, continuing a favorable trend that be-
gan in 1993. Total revenue for the world's airlines was $107
billion.122
The financial rebound of the airline industry was not atypical
of the industry, which is known for having extreme cycles in its
profits and losses over the years.123 What was surprising about
the recovery following the Gulf War was that it followed such a
drastic downturn in the airline industry. In the five years be-
122 AP, Air Passenger Traffic Up 8% Worldwide in 1994, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb.
15, 1995, at B5.
129 Richard Tomkins, Airlines Heading Off a Fall: US Carriers Better Prepared for
Downturn, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 11, 1998, at 24 ("Airlines stocks are notori-
ously cyclical. At the first whiff of hard times, companies tend to slash travel
budgets, sharply reducing the number of journeys made by business travelers,
who account for the bulk of airline profits.").
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tween 1989 and 1994, U.S. airlines suffered losses totaling $13
billion, which is more than all the profits U.S. airlines had made
in their history. 124 The years immediately following this five-year
period that erased all profits made by the airlines in the past six
decades were filled with record-setting profits and growth.
"[T]he 100 biggest airlines in the world posted a combined net
profit of $5.7 billion [in 1995]. Many U.S. carriers are reporting
record results [in 1996]. With passenger traffic soaring, the
seven largest U.S. airlines showed an average 34 percent gain in
second-quarter profits [in 1996]."125 Continental Airlines,
which was forced to file for bankruptcy following the Gulf War,
earned $224 million in 1995, one year after sustaining a $619
million loss. 1 2 6 Additionally, Delta Air Lines managed to earn
$200 million in a three-month period in 1997, after suffering $2
billion in losses between 1990 and 1994.127
Factors used to predict the long-term stability of airline profits
were also strong in the post-Gulf War years. In 1996, an average
aircraft was 67 percent full, which was the highest percentage
since World War 11.128 United Airlines flew the highest number
of passengers in one month, 8.3 million, in its seventy-year
history. 129
A major reason that the airline industry was able to recover
quickly from the historic downturn following the Gulf War was
the changing mindset of the airline executives. In the past, air-
lines had suffered through down times only to emerge with a
business plan focusing on expansion and obtaining a larger
market share when the economy improved.13 0 Following the
Gulf War, airlines suffered severe financial setbacks and no
longer had access to the cash needed to expand quickly and,
therefore, focused on making the airplanes it currently had
124 Id.
125 AP, Airline Profits Rising Again, but Future is Cloudy, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), Sept. 10, 1996, at 7C.
126 Id.
127 Roger Roy, Airline Workers Want to Share in Boom: The Airline Industry is Thriv-
ing, and Employees are Pushing to Get a Bigger Slice of the Pie, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct.
4, 1997, at Cl.
128 Steve Huettel, Big Airlines Returning to Profitability, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 2, 1996,
at 6.
129 Michael Skapinker, Airlines Get Ready for Downturn in Ticket Demand: Signs Are
Beginning to Appear of Excess Capacity, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 28, 1998, at 32.
130 Al Frank, Next Recession? Bring it on, Cash-Flush Airlines Say - Caution and
Computers Have Carriers Confident of Profits, Good Times or Bad, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
8, 1998, at G4.
2004]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
more profitable. 3 1 The airlines hoped this new approach would
help it prepare for future changes in the economic condition of
the country and the industry; however, the new approach was
placed under extreme strain following the September l1th ter-
rorist attacks.
C. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
On October 3, 2001, a London newspaper published a list of
airlines, including American carriers, and the immediate impact
the events of September 11 th had on their operations. The arti-
cle stated the following regarding five of the largest American
carriers:132
American Lost two planes in the US attacks and is to lay off 20,000 employees.
Continental The US carrier announced that 12,000 staff would be put on unpaid leave.
Top executives are to forgo salary for the rest of the year.
Delta The US carrier said it would axe 13,000 jobs and slash operations by 15 per
cent [sic]. Top executives [are] to forgo salary for the rest of the year.
Northwest The group will cut 10,000 jobs, a fifth of its workforce, and slash services.
United United owned two of the planes crashed by highjackers in September 11. It
is to cut 20,000jobs and capacity by 26 per cent [sic].
The attempts by the airlines to be better prepared for the
next economic downturn could not prepare them for the devas-
tating effects of the terrorist attacks in the United States. The
impact was compounded by the fact that four of the industry's
airplanes were used in the attacks. The airlines were experienc-
ing a decline in use and profits prior to the attacks, but the at-
tacks magnified the problem and added new issues that the
industry was not prepared to address. The following chart,
based on information in the ATA Report, demonstrates the im-
mediate impact that the attacks had and the slow recovery over
the months following the attacks by illustrating passenger traffic,
capacity, and income yield trends for the industry as a whole.1 33
131 Id. ("Instead of... customary cuts, airlines are slowing the pace of acquir-
ing new jets, identifying expenses that can be trimmed without irritating custom-
ers, and relying more on computers to get the biggest yield possible from each
seat in order to weather any economic downturn.").
132 AP, How the Attacks Have Hit Airlines, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 3, 2001, at
Home News.
133 The information in the chart is approximate and based on information
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The most important factor for an airline when analyzing its
financial situation is the amount of revenue earned for every
seat mile flown. For example, a plane with 10 seats that flies 100
miles and charges $10 per passenger would earn $0.10 per seat
mile flown on that flight if it is full. However, if the flight only
has five passengers, the airlines will only earn $0.05 per seat
mile. The comparison nationally from July 2001 to July 2002
shows that the airlines were earning 8.7 percent less per mile
nearly a year after the attacks than they had been earning just
prior to the attacks, which was an amount already affected by
the start of an economic downturn."' Even a year after the at-
tacks, the airlines had not recovered from the impact on the
entire industry. Marilyn Adams wrote in August 2002, that the
"[a]irlines suffered a record $1.4 billion combined loss in the
second quarter [of 2002], with American Airlines, the world's
largest carrier, posting the industry's biggest loss: $495 mil-
lion."' 5 Further, even the small budget carrier Southwest, the
only airline to not suffer extreme losses following the attacks,
experienced a 42 percent drop-off in its net income.1"6 This was
in addition to another airline, US Airways, America's seventh-
largest airline, filing for bankruptcy protection.1
37
During a six-month period in 2002, US Airways lost $517 mil-
lion, Delta lost $583 million, United lost $851 million, and
American lost over $1 billion. 138 The losses sustained by the in-
dustry were cushioned by the money provided by the federal
government to help the airline industry following the Septem-
ber 11th attacks. The federal government immediately ap-
proved $5 billion in aid to the airlines following the incident
134 AP, July Figures Provide No Relieffor Airlines, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 22, 2002,
at 9 (reporting July airline figures).
135 Marilyn Adams, Losses Continue for Carriers, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 2002, at 3B.
136 Id.
137 Paul Marks, Airlines Show Few Signs of Recovery; US Airways Is Latest Carrier to
Reach Bankruptcy, HARTORD COURANT, Aug. 13, 2002, at Al (noting US Airway's
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and promised an additional $10 billion in emergency loans for
airlines that qualified.1"9 This helped to keep the losses sus-
tained by the airlines in 2001 to just over $7.7 billion, which was
over four billion dollars more than the pre-attack estimates, but
less than the twelve billion dollars that the airlines would have
lost without the emergency government aid.14 ° The ideal scena-
rio would be for the airlines to use the money to overcome the
immediate impact of the attacks and transition into the new,
higher cost security regime that was implemented in the months
following the attacks. However, the airlines continued to strug-
gle with reported losses exceeding $10 billion in 2002,14 which
was compounded by demanding new security measures that
needed to be funded by the airlines, and, with the threat of an
impending war with Iraq, increased fuel prices. 14 2 Further, pas-
sengers' concerns regarding travel provided an additional obsta-
cle for the airlines.
D. THE SECOND GULF WAR
The ATA Report was released in March 2003, just weeks
before the United States invaded Iraq and commenced the sec-
ond war in that region in just over a decade. A large portion of
the Report was aimed at outlining the potential devastating ef-
fects this war may have on the struggling airline industry. Ignor-
ing the possibility of a war, the airlines were predicted to lose in
excess of $6.7 billion in 2003.143 Using the $6.7 billion figure as
a starting point, the ATA Report presented four scenarios for
war and the possible effects of each on the American airline in-
dustry. The first scenario contemplates no war, which consists
of a straight comparison between the industry's 2002 numbers
with the predictions for 2003 without factoring in the effects of a
war or another terrorist attack. The second factors in a war that
is the equivalent of the 1991 Gulf War. The scenario labeled
"Most Likely" contemplates a fall in passenger demand that sur-
passes the Gulf War decline and is based on future passenger
bookings available at the time of publication. Finally, the devas-
tating scenario of a war equivalent to the Gulf War, in addition
139 ATA Report, supra note 120, at 15.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 22.
142 Every one cent per gallon increase in the price of fuel costs the airline
industry $180 million annually. See ATA Report, supra note 120, at 19.
143 Id. at 29.
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to another major terrorist attack in the United States, is
analyzed. 144
Gulf War
Gulf War Most Likely Equivalent Plus
2003 Scenarios14 5  No War Equivalent Prediction Terrorism
Net Profit/(Losses) $(6.7)B $(7.6)B $(10.7)B $(13.0)B
Traffic +5% -3% -8% -12%
Passengers +28M -18M -52M -75M
Daily Flights +500 -700 -2,200 -3,800
Employment +11,000 -31,000 -70,000 -98,000
Fuel Cost (per gallon) $0.83 $0.78 $0.93 $1.10
Airfares +0.2% Stable -4% -9%
Load Factor 73% 72% 73% 75%
Breakeven Load 80% 80% 85% 92%
Factor
'- Id. (outlining the scenarios presented in the remaining pages of the
report).
145 Id. The chart is based on the following assumptions:
1. In all cases, the war is expected to last for one quarter (90) days.
Obviously, the impacts would be magnified if the war were to last
longer.
2. The Base Case [- No War scenario] assumes there is no war and
shows how the airline recovery might continue after two years of
losses following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It assumes a growing
economy, which would be the principal driver for increased
traffic levels.
3. The Gulf War Equivalent scenario is based on domestic travel
falling 5 percent while international traffic falls 15 percent. The
overall traffic decline would be 7.8 percent and recovery to pre-
war levels would take about six months. Fuel prices would fall
sharply following a quarter in which they have spiked higher.
Airfares are assumed to rise by 3 percent during the war but fall
slightly during the recovery.
4. The Most Likely scenario is based on information from the
airlines on advance bookings for March and April compiled
specifically for this report. These advance bookings suggest that
traffic will fall more sharply than during the Gulf War I.
Further, the Most Likely scenario assumes that an Iraqi war on
top of the already depleted crude oil inventories will continue to
see high but modestly declining crude prices [, which is the basis
for determining fuel costs]. As after the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
airlines are expected to try and attract travelers with lower
prices.
5. The Gulf War Equivalent scenario coupled with a terrorist attack
within the U.S. is expected to bring even more difficult
circumstances. During the 1991 Gulf War, airline traffic across
the Atlantic initially declined by 43 percent. In this case
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The "No-War" scenario is obviously no longer possible and
two of the three remaining scenarios appear to underestimate
the length and impact of the second Gulf War. The "Gulf-War-
Equivalent" and "Most-Likely" scenarios estimated a 90-day war
and a six-month recovery period. Both of these estimates seem
inadequate as hopes for a quick and smooth operation within
Iraq fade. Further, it is difficult to compare the first and second
Gulf Wars because the airlines were in different financial situa-
tions prior to the commencement of each. Before the first Gulf
War, the airlines were experiencing a minor drop-off in profits
but were emerging from a strong decade that saw expansion and
unprecedented growth. Whereas the situation leading up to the
second Gulf War was plagued with the aftermath of September
lth. 14 6 Such findings are evidenced by the following excerpt
from an article in USA Today:
Since September 11, 2001, airlines have suffered $18 billion in
losses, have piled up $100 billion in debt and have virtually no
access to the capital markets. As we engage in war with Iraq, air-
lines are the weakest they have ever been. Airlines have been
devastated, not by competition or the structure of the industry,
but by a doubling of fuel prices and lack of demand resulting
from war and terrorism threats.147
Either prior to or within the first few weeks of the new Iraqi
conflict, US Airways, United, and Hawaiian airlines were all op-
erating under bankruptcy protection.14 The impact of the war
was immediately felt industry-wide as "most major U.S. air-
lines. . . cancel[led] flights, especially overseas, as passenger
loads... dropped and soaring fuel prices... hit hard."14 9 Stan-
dard and Poor issued an analysis of the airline industry, which
stated that the "airline industry is in dire condition.""15 The air-
international traffic is assumed to decline by that amount for a
full quarter and domestic traffic is assumed to fall by 25 percent.
Crude prices are projected to increase sharply in this case.
Id.
146 David Nicklaus, Airlines Look for Emergency Exits as Industry Dives, ST. Louis
POsT-DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 2003 (outlining the struggling airline industry in the run
up to military action).
147 James C. May, Cost of 'Survival' Is Too High, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2003, at
18A.
148 AP, Coping with Airline Cuts, Bankruptcies, Wartime Travel, SEATrLE TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2003, at L3 (listing bankrupt airlines).
149 Id.
150 AP, Traditional Airlines in Fight to Survive, Says S&P Equity Analyst in Airline
Sector Outlook; Iraq War Exacerbates Deterioration of Fundamentals that Predated Events
of September 11, 2001, PR NEwswIRE (N.Y.), Mar. 27, 2003, at Financial News.
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lines have responded by seeking $9 billion in aid from the fed-
eral government to bail out the industry, which would be in
addition to the nearly $15 billion already committed to the in-
dustry in the wake of the September l1th attacks.' 51 However,
the government is only expected to approve between $1.5 and
$3 billion in aid. 11 2 Further, $3 billion will not completely re-
lieve the pressure of the more than $10 billion in losses that the
ATA conservatively estimated that the airlines will lose in the
wake of another Gulf War.
V. CONCLUSION
Sometimes lost in the debate regarding the financial stability
of the airline industry is the fact that passengers have valid rea-
sons for avoiding airlines. The unprecedented attacks in the
United States demonstrated that Americans are vulnerable to at-
tack even within their own country, which is something that
Americans never had to fear before September 11 th. The pro-
cedures required to make flying safe for the public also make
flying an inconvenience and decrease passengers' willingness to
take the risks associated with flying. For instance, a two-hour
flight can take four hours or more once the new security mea-
sures and longer lines are implemented. A traveler, especially a
business traveler whose time is extremely valuable, might decide
it is more economical to take a train or drive in order to avoid
the increased security.
The combination of September l1th, a second Gulf War, a
struggling economy, and less incentive for passengers to choose
to fly, might prove to be the death of the airline industry. There
is no simple answer to solving the airline dilemma, but taking
every step to protect the airlines, which are vital to the American
economy, is a necessity during these turbulent times. One step
that the federal government can take is to nullify the liability
waivers airlines entered into during the boom years of the mid
to late 1990s by requiring airlines to reiterate the previous
$75,000 liability limit in their tariffs prior to receiving federal
aid.
151 See generally Demetri Sevastopulos, Senators Push for Airlines Aid in War
Budget, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 28, 2003, at 6; Caroline Daniel & Demetri
Sevastopulos, Senators Consider War Aid for Airlines, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 27,
2003, at 20.
152 Sevastopulos, supra note 151, at 6; Daniel, supra note 151, at 20.
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There are two ways the waivers entered into by the airlines in
the late 1990s can be avoided. The courts can continue to inter-
pret the agreement to require either a new tariff to be filed with
the Department of Transportation as the Price court did or, al-
ternatively, the courts could go a step further and expand on
the rationale in the Verdesca case and refuse to implement the
liability waiver even if the airline has filed a new tariff incorpo-
rating the new limits. Additionally, the federal government
could condition all further financial assistance to the airlines
upon the filing of a new tariff that effectively reinstates the old
$75,000 limit which was waived by the Intercarrier Agreement.
Reinstating the old liability limit would require the airlines to
breach their obligations under the Intercarrier Agreement, but
this is a small price to pay to avoid bankruptcy and/or liquida-
tion. This is especially true considering that breaching an inter-
national private agreement would only give the other airlines
the option to breach the agreement and there would be no pun-
ishment for an American airline withdrawing from the
agreement.
The approach used is not necessarily important. Ultimately,
the airline industry will rebound, even if only a few of the air-
lines emerge from the crisis financially sound. As soon as the
airlines are profitable again, the public will resume its outcry
regarding the inadequacy of the low liability limits, but until
then, the airlines need a reprieve from the potential for high
jury awards that would essentially be paid out of federal aid
funds. For example, if an international airline catastrophe oc-
curs with one hundred passengers on board, the airline's liabil-
ity would be $7.5 million under the old Warsaw Convention
regime. This amount is not small, but the set liability would save
the airline millions in litigation expenses and provide some re-
covery for the families of the victims. Conversely, if the Intercar-
rier Agreement were applied to the same incident the airline
would have liability of at least $13.5 million. This is in addition
to the litigation costs of proving that the airline took all neces-
sary measures to avoid the incident. A failure to prove the air-
line took such measures would open it up to unlimited liability.
It is conceivable that a plaintiff could prove that the airline did
not take all reasonable measures to assure that the terrorist did
not board the plane and, therefore, the airline could be liable
for hundreds of millions of dollars in awards. In essence, it is
possible that one international airline catastrophe with a large
number of injured passengers or fatalities could eliminate a sig-
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nificant portion of the $3.5 billion aid package that the federal
government may provide the airlines.
It is imperative to protect the airline industry because its im-
pact permeates beyond convenient travel for businesses and va-
cation seekers. The airline industry is responsible, either
directly or indirectly, for over eleven million jobs in the United
States. 153 Continuing to allow the airlines to sustain severe ups
and downs financially is not beneficial to the economy as a
whole because it can quickly raise unemployment rates, as well
as harm numerous companies that depend heavily on contracts
with airlines to sustain their profitability.
It is also important to recognize that a smaller percentage of
the lower airfares being charged by airlines actually reaches the
airlines' profit margin. The percentage of a $200 roundtrip air-
line ticket that is attributed to taxes and fees grew over 250 per-
cent since 1972, and taxation of the airline industry as a whole
increased seventy-six percent between 1992 and 2002.154
M Taxes
1972 (7%) 1992 (15%) 2002 (26%)
The larger percentage lost to taxes was not a huge problem dur-
ing the late 1990s when the airlines were performing well, but
following September 11 th, when additional taxes were added for
increased security, the taxes started eating away at the already-
low profits airlines were making from each ticket because the
market demanded low airfares without compensating for the in-
crease in taxes on each ticket.
The airlines are facing an extremely difficult situation and
some of the airlines that were previously considered the strong-
est will undoubtedly fail to emerge from the crisis. The combi-
153 ATA Report, supra note 120, at 25 (summarizing the direct and indirect im-
pact of civil aviation in Table H, Employment Impact of Civil Aviation by Sector, 2000).
154 Id. at 17.
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nation of lower passenger fares, fewer people flying for both
business and personal excursions, the higher costs of operating
an airline because of increased taxes, security requirements, ris-
ing fuel costs, the uncertainty of the second Gulf War, and the
potential for more terrorist attacks might prove to be devastat-
ing to the industry. The federal government and the American
people rely on the stability of the airline industry and the air-
lines must be protected from extensive losses during the war
and its aftermath. Federal aid will play an important part in the
recovery of the airlines, but it is not sufficient to protect the air-
lines alone. The federal government or the judiciary need to
assure that the aid will be used to help the airlines emerge from
its crisis and not to pay for a large damage award. The most
effective way to accomplish this is to reinstate and/or reinforce
the $75,000 liability limit contained in the Warsaw Convention
until the airlines have a stronger financial base. Enforcing the
higher limits of the Intercarrier Agreements would place a
strong burden on the airlines that could be avoided. There is
no guarantee that limiting the liability on international flights
would help the airlines survive the current situation, especially
since the Warsaw Convention does nothing to limit liability on
domestic flights, but in the current environment, the airlines
need all the predictability possible. Limiting the liability on in-
ternational flights has the potential to save the airlines billions if
there is another terrorist attack and, regardless of whether there
is another attack, it will continue to save the airlines millions in
litigation costs by imposing strict liability, capped at $75,000, for
the everyday litigation that arises in the airline industry.
